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This

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari

is

submitted

by

Applicant/Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft, who urges this Court to
accept Certiorari in this matter.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1 .

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of

Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46

(d), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, on the grounds that Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission,
215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) profoundly changes and
disrupts the long standing practice and standards governing the
referral of industrial claims to Medical Panels.
2.

Whether the Utah Supreme Court should grant a Writ of

Certiorari pursuant to Rule 46

(c), Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure, on the grounds that Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission,
215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) radically departs form
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings concerning
the preservation of issues for appeal, so as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
Petitioner seeks review by Petition for Writ of Certiorari of
the

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

decision

Ashcroft

v.

Industrial

Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) (See
Addendum "A").
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals from which this
Petition is taken was filed on June 16, 1993.
Motion

for Extension

of Time

Petitioner filed a

to File Petition For Writ of
1

Certiorari on July 15, 1993. On July 15, 1993 this Court entered
an Order Extending Time for Filing, granting Petitioner until
August 16, 1993 to file this Petition.
Jurisdiction to consider this Petition for Writ of Certiorari
is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by Article VIII, § 3, of
the Utah Constitution; Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3) and
(5), (1989); and Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is the controlling
statute and Rule R568-1-9(A) of the Utah Administrative Code is the
controlling Rule governing the issues raised in this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.

Copies of said Statute and Rule are attached

in Addendum "D".
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This claim was filed by Applicant/Petitioner for an industrial
injury he sustained while employed by Airfax Express on September
25, 1989. (R. at 1).

The employer's workers' compensation insurer

paid temporary total disability benefits from September 26, 1989
through June 5, 1990, as well as compensation for a 5% permanent
partial impairment.

(R. at 18).

Petitioner claimed that despite attempts he was unable to
return to work, that he needed additional medical care, additional
temporary

total

compensation

and

a higher

permanent

partial

impairment rating. (R. at 1 ). The Carrier refused those benefits,
and Mr. Ashcroft filed an Application for Hearing.
2

A formal

Hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge on May 19,
1992. (R. at 22) .
The Administrative Law Judge on June 29, 1992, denied the
claim for additional compensation, medical benefits and impairment
benefits without referring the matter to a Medical Pa"**39-46, Addendum " B " ) .

(R. at

Mr. Ashcroft filed a Motion for Review with

the Industrial Commission which was subsequently denied on August
21, 1992

(R. at 69-80, Addendum " C " ) .

He filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the Industrial Commissions refusal to convene a
Medical

Panel, but which

remanded

the case

to the

Industrial

Commission to "conduct a review employing the proper standard of
preponderance of the evidence." (Addendum " A " ) .
STATEMENT
There is no dispute as to the basic facts of Mr. Ashcroft's
industrial injury.

An initial period of compensation and medical

treatment were in fact paid.

This dispute arises because the

insurance carrier discontinued all benefits before the Petitioner
had reached maximum medical improvement, and because the treating
physicians

felt he had a higher impairment

than the insurance

carrier was willing to pay.
Following his injury on September 25, 1989, and an initial
evaluation in the emergency room, Mr. Ashcroft was seen and treated
by his family doctor, Dr. M. K. McGregor, who continued to treat
him during

the following

two months.

(t

at

130-136).

Dr.

McGregor advised complete bed rest and diagnosed him as having a
3

bulging disc/spinal stenosis.

(R. at 133).

After two months of

unsuccessful treatment, Dr. McGregor referred the patient to Dr.
Donald G. Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss initially saw Mr. Ashcroft on October 20, 1989 and
diagnosed, "Central disc herniation with minor spinal stenosis at
this level."
therapy

He recommended conservative treatment with physical

primarily

for work

consideration for surgery.

hardening, but also had
(R. at 146).

him under

In December, 1989 Dr.

Bliss noted Mr. Ashcroft's continuing bilateral leg pain and after
reviewing a myelogram and CT scan, his diagnoses was "Sciatica-like
symptoms with central disc herniation and no definite evidence of
neural impingement."

(R. at 150).

Dr. Bliss noted that Mr.

Ashcroft's multiple level disc disease indicated that he has had
pre-existing problems.

(R. at 151).

On February 2, 1990, in

response to an inquiry for State Vocational Rehabilitation, and to
the dismay of the insurance adjuster, Dr. Bliss reported that Mr.
Ashcroft's "... evaluation and treatment are incomplete." (R. at
153).
At the behest of the insurance carrier, Mr. Ashcroft's case
was transferred to Dr. Neal Capel, an orthopedic physician.
157-173).

(R. at

Dr. Capel's initial visit notes in reference to the

insurance adjusters referral instructions state as follows:
Liberty Mutual account manager determined his
permanent partial disability as 5%. March 26, 1990, is
the cutoff of benefits...
The patient will have is
disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his
work hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks. He will be
reevaluated on May 13 before he is released for unlimited
activity. He seems to have had a strong improvement in
his attitude and seems to be desirous of accepting and
4

working with these provisions.

(R. at 158).

Dr. Capel placed him on a work hardening and conditioning program.
(R. at 158).
On May 10, 1990, Mr. Ashcroft experienced intrascapular pain,
and was treated

emergency room.

Dr. Capel diagnosed this

incident as "anxiety reaction with somatization.

(R. at 159).

Dr. Capel continued to recommend general conditioning.
159)

i

(R. at

5, 1990, Dr. Capel's office notes state, "...

The

patient has no change in his status and was given a work release.
(R. at 160).
Although he had been released to work

Cape]

Ashcroft continued to have medical problems and Dr. Capel continued
to give medical treatment, the last visit being March 15, 1991.
Petitioner complained that sitting made him uncomfortable and that
he had aching muscles (R. at 161), He reported low back pain in
November 1990 after he lifted two or three pieces of firewood. In
March 19*

Mr. Ashcroft reported back pain after he had bent over

to clean up after his dog, and that he thereafter had difficulty
straightening up. (R. at 167). Dr. Capel concluded that he had a
recurrence of iliolumbar strain sprain and noted:
I further advised him that as far as the Industrial
Commission is concerned, he is an administrative catch 22
situation where he cannot force them to assume care of
his present complaint and while it is possibly associated
in quality relation, it is a new episode. (R. at 167)
After that Mr. Ashcroft concluded that he was not going to get
satisfactory care from Dr. Capel and changed to Dr. D. R. McNaught
on May 8, 1991.

Dr. McNaught concluded that he had severe
5

sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar discs L4, L5 and possible
L6.

He recommended surgery, but surgery was never performed

because

it was discovered

that Mr. Ashcroft had AIDS which

complicated the situation by rendering surgery a more difficult
option.

(R. at 174-175).

During this period of evaluation, on August 19, 1991, Dr.
McNaught stated that Mr. Ashcroft was unable to return to work (R.
at 178). On September 5, 1991, Dr. McNaught reported "Apparently
he was released from light work at sometime in the past, which I
feel in retrospect was probable in error, as he does appear to
require a more aggressive approach to his low back . . .ff

(R. at

179).
Finally on April 23, 1992, after several other possible
interventions including chymopapain treatment had been considered
and ruled out, Dr. McNaught concluded that Mr. Ashcroft had a 10%
disability rating.
surgeon

for

(R. at 177). Dr. John Sanders, a consulting

Dr. McNaught,

impairment at 15%.

independently

rated

the permanent

(R. at 191).

During this period, Mr. Ashcroft also received at his own
expense

chiropractic

care

from

Dr. Randall

N. Wageman

from

September 27, 1991, through December, 1991, at which time he was
forced to terminate treatment for financial reasons.
concluded that Mr. Ashcroft suffered,
post-traumatic

lumbar

Dr. Wageman

f,

Chronic moderate to severe

intervertebral

disc

syndrome

with

radiculopathy resulting from over-exertion or strenuous movements."
He further found " an exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries

6

sustained in the original accident" of 1989.

(R. at 122).

Respondents did not have Mr. Ashcroft personally examined by
a physician of their own choosing, but did have Dr. Boyd Holbrook
perform a "file review".

On April 10

1992, Dr. Holbrook concluded

on the basis of his examination of the medical records

vihich did

not include the reports of Dr. Wageman, that the majority of Mr.
Ashcroft's problems were not industrial in nature and that no
further medical treatment was needed in connection with his 1989
industrial injury.

(R. at 23-31).

The Administrative Law Judge found that there was not a
well-supported rating in the record and the
Administrative Law Judge can only note that a 5%
impairment is reasonable for an unoperated disc problem
according to the AMA Guides To The Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment, Table 53."
(R. at 45, Exhibit
"B").
Despite request by Mr. Ashcroft's attorney, the Administrative Law
Judge refused to refer Mr. Ashcroft to a Medical Panel.
47).

(R. at

This refusal was subsequently sustained by the Industrial

Commission

(R

at 67, Exhibit " C " ) .

Petitioner's claim

for additional disability

benefits wa#S

denied by the Administrative Law Judge on June 29, 1992 (R. at 45,
Exhibit " B " ) .

He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial

Commission on July 15, 1992 (R. at 47-54), but it was denied on
August 21, 1992,

(R. at 64-68, Exhibit " C " ) .

A R G U M E N T

7

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO RULE 46 (d), UTAH RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT
ASHCROFT v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 215 UTAH
ADV. REP. 50 (UTAH APP. 06/16/93) PROFOUNDLY
CHANGES AND DISRUPTS THE LONG STANDING
PRACTICE AND STANDARDS GOVERNING THE REFERRAL
OF INDUSTRIAL CLAIMS TO MEDICAL PANELS.
It

would

be

difficult

to

underestimate

the

value

and

importance of a Medical Panel referral to an injured workers. The
workers'

compensation

system

is

predicated

upon

being

an

expeditious and inexpensive method for resolving industrial claims.
If

injured

workers

were

required

to

obtain

detailed

and

comprehensive medical reports documenting their injuries and the
resulting degree of disability, many like Petitioner, would not
obtain the compensation to which they are entitled.
The Court of Appeals decision in Ashcroft v. Industrial
Commission, 215 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. 06/16/93) establishes
a

precedent

overturning

a longstanding

Industrial

Commission

practice of referring claims to a Medical Panel on the basis of
short summary medical reports which do not exhaustively discuss
medical

causation.

Injured

workers

are

only

required

to

demonstrate a prima facia case and it is the Medical Panel report
which is relied upon to provide a detailed review of the injury and
the resulting disability, if any.

In addition, the Court of

Appeals also failed to address other statutory basis for referrals
to Panels.

If the Court of Appeals decision in this case is

allowed to stand unmodified, it will severely restrict the injured
workers' access to Medical Panels and their corresponding ability
to obtain the full compensation to which they are otherwise

8

entitled.
Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) provides as
follows:
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course
of employment, and if the employer or its insurance
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed
by the commission.
In response to Petitioner's claim that despite requests by
counsel, the Administrative Law Judge failed and/or refused to
refer this matter to a Medical Panel, Respondent Utah Industrial
Commission in its Order Denying Motion for Review states as
follows:
the Applicant has failed to show medical and legal
causation. Under these circumstances, no medical panel
is necessary. (R. at 45).
While that argument might have some merit in the initial
formulation of policy, it has none in the execution of the policy
presently contained in statute, rules and regulations.

It is

expressly to determine medical causation and degree of disability
that referrals to Medical Panels are made.
Utah

Industrial

Commission

Rule

R568-1-9

governing

the

"necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel" provided in
relevant part as follows:
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission
adopts the following guidelines in determining the
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1 . One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
9

shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole
person,
(b)
Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days,
and/or,
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, Exhibit D.
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved".

The

Court of Appeals recognized this important principal when it noted:
... Thus, the rule requires the Commission to convene a
medical panel when the evidence supports conflicting
industrial impairment ratings with more than a five
percent difference. If the evidence regarding impairment
ratings supports ratings that vary by more than five
percent, as petitioner asserts, a medical panel would be
necessary to resolve the differences.
In short, the statute explicitly grants discretion
to the Commission as to whether to convene a medical
panel.
The Commission, in turn, restricted its own
discretion by promulgating the Rule requiring it to
convene a medical panel in certain instances. .Id. at 51.
The rule does not, as the Court of Appeals implies, provide
that a Medical Panel will only be convened when the injured worker
has already proved both medical and legal causation.

Rather the

Rules states that a Panel will be used when there are "significant
medical issues involved".

The Rule specifically states that

significant medical issues are involved when there are any of the
following;

conflicting

medical

reports

of permanent

physical

impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person, a disparity
of more than 90 days on the temporary total cutoff date or more
10

than $2,000 in medical expenses in controversy.
It can not be seriously disputed that this case clearly
contains

conflicting

medical

reports

of

permanent

physical

impairment which vary by more than 5% of the whole person.
Holbrook gave Mr. Ashcroft a zero % impairment.

Dr.

(R. at 23-31), Dr.

McNaught rated the Petitioner at 10% impairment of the whole person
(R. at 177), and Dr. Sanders indicated that he had a 15% whole
person rating (R. at 191), a difference of 15%.
It little matters that Respondents believe that the doctor's
ratings are "not well supported" (R. at 37). It appears that at
least Dr. McNaught did not extensively document his 10% rating
because the insurance carrier told him that they agreed with it.
(R. at 177).

In such a case, Dr. McNaught reasonably concluded

that he would not have to give all of his subsidiary findings which
led him to conclude that the Petitioner had a 10% impairment.
Respondents should be estopped from attacking the lack of detailed
support for the disability ratings when they were responsible for
the omission of that support.
The Rule does not say that referral will occur only when the
Administrative Law Judge finds that there are "well supported
conflicting medical reports;" rather it states that referral will
occur even when there are merely "conflicting medical reports".
(emphasis added).

It is, in fact, to determine the validity of the

initial medical reports that referrals are required to Medical
Panels when there is more than a 5% variance in the impairment
ratings.
11

The Administrative Law Judge adopted a finding of 5% whole
person permanent impairment with absolutely no factual support in
the record. None of the many doctors who examined Mr. Ashcroft or
his records ever assigned a 5% rating.

The only support in the

record for a 5% rating is the determination of the insurance
carrier's account manager in April 1990 that 5% was appropriate.
(R. at 158).
There was also

"conflicting medical opinions as to the

temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days" as
provided in section (A)(1)(b) of the Administrative Rule.

Dr.

Capel gave the Petitioner a work release on June 5, 1990 (R. at
160) and that is the date Respondents have relied on for the cutoff
of

temporary

September

5,

total

compensation.

1991, well

over

a

However,
year

qualification that that date was in error.

Dr. McNaught

later

stated

on

without

(R. at 179). Clearly

there is a dispute as to the appropriate temporary total cutoff
date which vary by far more than the mere 90 days provided in the
Rule.

This is another issue on which the assistance of a Medical

Panel was essential and required under the Rule.
Finally, there are medical expenses in controversy amounting
to

more

than

$2,000.00,

as

required

by

the

Rule.

The

Administrative Law Judge made no findings on this issue, however
the record does specifically document that there is at least
$4,000.00 in disputed medical bills.

(R. at 116). In addition,

Mr. Ashcroft needs additional medical care which Respondents have
refused to authorize.
12

The conflict in the medical reports and concern over legal and
medical causation is why referral to a Medical Panel is required in
the circumstances presented here and the failure to do so is more
than an abuse of discretion-it is plain error.

See Lipman v.

Industrial Commission, 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979) and Schmidt v.
Industrial Commission, 617 P. 2d 693 (Utah 1980) interpreting the
former Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made
referrals to Medical Panels mandatory in cases of denied liability.
Although reference to a Medical Panel under Utah Code
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion
is

not

unrestricted

and

has

been

made

mandatory

in

some

circumstances by the Commission's own Rules and Regulations (Utah
Administrative Code R568-1-9).

The Court of Appeals properly

recognized the manditory nature of the Rule.
The failure to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such
referral is mandatory is plain error. "In some cases, such as where
the evidence of causal connection between the work-related event
and the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer
the case to a Medical Panel may be an abuse of discretion.11
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308
(Utah 1985).

See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah

1986).
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related
injury and the Petitioner's claims for additional compensation and
medical care, if not clear, was at least uncertain and failure to
refer the matter to a Medical Panel was error.
13

The Court of Appeals Opinion sustaining the refusual to refer
this matter to a Medical Panel should at the least be reversed and
the matter remanded with directions to convene a Medical Panel
since

failure

to do was

in direct conflict with

Commission practice and rule.

Industrial

The failure to obtain a Medical

Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking
essential and necessary information to adjudicate Petitioner's
claim.
In holding that a referral to a Medical Panel was not required
that Court of Appeals stated as follows:
Here, the Commission determined:
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in
connection with his assertion that a 15
percent rating was appropriate, was supported
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic.
We need some justification, and in the absence
of such, we cannot speculate. In the case of
Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to
any appropriate rating, other than a statement
that the adjustor had decided upon a five
percent rating. We therefore conclude that
the evidence does not support the applicant in
this regard.
In short, the Commission found no specific or supported
impairment rating in the record, much less conflicting
impairment ratings. Nor did the Commission find that the
ratings given related to an industrial cause. Thus,
there was no departure from the agency rule because the
agency rule did not apply.
Therefore, we need not
consider whether any departure was reasonable and
rational. Id., at 51.
The error in this holding is that the analysis is incomplete.
Even if one accepts the Court of Appeals rational in regards to the
disparity

in the ratings,

(which Petitioner

argues below is

unreasonable), the Court of Appeals complete failed to even address
14

the other two independent basis for manditory referral to a Medial
Panel, i.e., conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total
cutoff date which vary by more than 90 days and medical expenses in
controversy amounting to more than $2,000.00. Either of those two
basis would independently justify and require the referral to a
Panel.
The Court of Appeals decision is faulty for not engaging in
complete analysis and ignoring and failing to even address two of
the three basis under which referral is required.

One need not

even examine the disparity in the ratings since referral was
required due to conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary
total cutoff date and medical expenses amounting to more than
$2,000.00.
In regards to the ratings however, the Industrial Commissions
analysis which the Court of Appeals adopts is flawed.

The

Industrial Commission has never required comprehensive medical
reports in order to support a referral to a Medical Panel.

In

fact, the long standing Industrial Commission practice is to rely
on "Summary Medical Reports" which are really just fill-in-theblank forms, which only ask the Doctor to supply a rating without
the necessity for detailed support.

The Industrial Commission

produces a form for just this purpose, a copy of which is included
in the Addendum as Exhibit "E".

The purpose of these initial

ratings is simply to determine whether a Panel should be convened.
It is the Medical Panel report which requires "detailed medical
analysis and reasoning". The Industrial Commission can not print,
15

supply and require the use of "Summary Medical Reports" and then
disavow their use to support referral to a Medical Panel.
In

addition,

the

Commission

and

the

Court

of

Appeals

completely ignore Dr. McNaught's 10% rating, which goes without
challenge. The 15% rating by Dr. Sanders is dismissed as allegedly
not supported by medical analysis or logic. That allegation is not
supported by the medical report of Dr. Sanders.

It should be

remembered that Dr. Sanders was brought in only as a consulting
surgeon for Dr. McNaught, and his rating of 15% was based on Dr.
McNaught's findings and reports. Dr. Capel either determined that
he could not at that time rate Mr. Ashcroft or give him a 5%
rating.

The insurance carriers, physician, Dr. Holbrook on the

basis of an incomplete file review and without the benefit of
personally examining Mr. Ashcroft gives him a zero % impairment.
Clearly there are conflicting medical opinions which vary by more
than 5%.

II.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI PURSUANT TO RULE 46 (C), UTAH RULES
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, ON THE GROUNDS THAT
ASHCROFT V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION. 215 UTAH
ADV. REP. 50 (UTAH APP. 06/16/93) RADICALLY
DEPARTS FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS
CONCERNING
THE
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL SO AS TO
CALL FOR AN EXERCISE OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
POWER OF SUPERVISION.
The Court of Appeals stated as follows:
We first consider the threshold issue of whether
16

Ashcroft properly preserved for review the issues he now
raises, namely issues of sufficiency of the evidence,
standard of proof and adequacy of the ALJ's findings,
given that he failed to raise these issues before the
Commission.
* * *

Ashcroft failed to raise the above issues before the
Commission. Of those issues, all except for his claim
that the Commission employed the wrong standard of proof,
are claims that could have been presented to the
Commission. See id. Thus, we deem that Ashcroft has
waived the issues of sufficiency of the evidence and
adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he cannot now
raise them for the first time of petition for judicial
review. Id., at 50.
The rational for this rule is that by raising an issue at the
administrative level, "either the administrative law judge or the
Commission could have adjudicated the issue." Pease v. Industrial
Commission, 694 P. 2d 613 (Utah 1984).
Petitioner actually raised five (5) specific alleged errors in
his Motion for Review, namely; (1) Rejection by the ALJ of two
permanent partial disability ratings in favor of a two year old
rating done by the "Liberty Mutual account manager." (2)

The

failure of the ALJ to order that a Medical Panel be convened to
consider

among

other

items

the question

of maximum

medical

improvement. (3) The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not
decided upon a course of treatment. (4)

The ALJ lost or ignored

the chiropractor's results that the applicant was improving with
chiropractic

treatment, and

(5) This case contains objective

evidence of several radiographically verified disc injuries, and
surgery was a clear possibility but for the complication of the
AIDS.
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While Petitioner did not specifically use the precise words of
"sufficiency of the evidence" and the "inadequacy of the ALJ's
findings", the substance of those arguments and challenges to the
ALJ's Order were in fact made to the Commission.

It is impossible

to consider the five (5) points Petitioner raised in his Motion for
Review as anything less than a full attack on the ALJ's findings
and the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
The

Utah

Industrial

Commission

clearly

believed

that

Petitioner was challenging the sufficiency of the ALJ's findings.
The Commission spends considerable

time addressing

findings and demonstrating that they were sufficient.

the ALJ's
In fact the

concluding paragraph of the Denial of Motion for Review is as
follows:
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's
findings, conclusions of law, and order were based upon
substantial evidence in light of the entire record, and
the legal conclusions were correct. The applicant has
failed to prove his case. Id. at 4.
Thus the purpose of the Rule was clearly met in this case, as the
Industrial Commission was put on notice of the specific claims that
Petitioner later raised before the Court of Appeals and the
Commission not only "could have adjudicated the issue", it did in
fact fully address and adjudicate those issues. Even the Court of
Appeals goes into some depth as to the sufficiency of the ALJ's
findings.
Petitioner should not be precluded from raising an issue on
appeal merely because the Court of Appeals does not believe that he
specifically phrased it in the manner they would prefer.
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Form

should

not prevail over substance.

The Rules of Appellate

procedure provide that "The statement of a question presented will
be deemed to comprise every subsidiary question fairly included
therein". Rule 49 (a)(4) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Strict pleading practice should not be applied in workers'
compensation

cases

as

such

severe

formality

would

make

it

impossible for a worker to pursue his or her own case without an
attorney. The essence of the workers' compensation system is that
it is a "user friendly" system without

excessive procedural

requirements.

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals decision in Ashcroft v. Industrial
Commission, supra, is flawed as having not considered and addressed
all of the issues properly raised by Petitioner.

The Court of

Appeals properly recognized that Rule R568-1-9(A) requires the
Industrial Commission to convene a Medical Panel in three specific
instances.

Petitioner alleged that he met all three independent

and alternative basis for referral to a Panel, however the Court of
Appeals only addressed one, namely whether there was a 5% disparity
in permanent impairment ratings.

The Court did not even consider

the issues of entitlement to temporary total compensation and
medical bills in excess of $2,000.00 which independantly warrented
the convening of a Medical Panel.

Even on the ratings issue the

Court failed to consider or address Dr. McNaught's 10% rating,
which when contrasted against Dr. Holbrook's zero % rating created
19

the required disparity of more than 5%.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals in dismissing Petitioners
ratings

as

being

without

analysis,

ignores

and

undermines

longstanding practice fostered by the Industrial Commissions own
form of "Summary Medical Records", which does not require analysis
but merely asks for a rating. Under the Rule in effect any medical
report in which the worker's medical provider states an opinion as
to a rating should be deemed sufficient evidence to establish a
dispute for the purpose of convening a Medical Panel, if the
dispute is significant under Rule R568-1-9.
Finally, Petitioner did properly challenge the Administrative
Law Judges findings before the Industrial Commission. His multiple
challenges in his Motion for Review can only be viewed as a full
assault on the Administrative Law Judges findings. Although stated
in general terms, the Industrial Commission was put on notice and
did in fact adjudicate the issue.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft respectfully request
that this Court accept Certiorari and that the decision Ashcroft v.
Industrial Commission be reversed in so far as it concerns the
terms under which a Medical Panel must be convened and the
Petitioner's duty to preserve issues for appeal.
DATED this I(pfli day of August, 1993.

BRUCE J. WZLSON, ESQ.
Attorney itorJ Applicant/Petitioner
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ADDENDUM
EXHIBIT A:

Utah Court of Appeals decision Ashcroft v.
Industrial Commission.

EXHIBIT B:

ALJ's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order (June 29, 1992).

EXHIBIT C:

Order Denying Motion for Review (August 21, 1992).

EXHIBIT D:

Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988).
Rule R568-1-9 of the Utah Administrative Code.

EXHIBIT E:

Summary Medical Record form.
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OPINIO:

Denis Ashcroft,

MaryT. Noonan
Ciafk of the Court

(For Publication)
Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 920586-CA

Industrial Commission of Utah;
Airfax Express, Inc.; and
Liberty Mutual insurance
Company,

F I L E D
(June 16, 1993)

Respondents.
Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Bruce J. Wilson and Sam Primavera, Provo, for
Petitioner
Michael E. Dyer and Michael A. Peterson, Salt Lake
City, for Airfax Express, Inc., and Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.
Benjamin A. Sims, Salt Lake City, for Industrial
Commission

Before Judges Garff, Greenwood, and Orme.
GARFF, Judge:
Petitioner, Denis Ashcroft, seeks review by this court of an
Industrial Commission order denying him workers compensation
benefits. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS
On September 25, 1989, Ashcroft sustained an industrial
injury while unloading freight from a truck. The employer7s
compensation insurer paid temporary total disability benefits
from September 26, 1989 through June 5, 1990 as well as
compensation for a five percent permanent partial impairment.
On September 26, 1991, Ashcroft petitioned for additional
temporary disability compensation, an increased permanent partial
disability rating and medical expenses. Ashcroft alleged that
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the same September 25, 1989 industrial injury rendered him unable
to work.
After a formal hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
denied Ashcroft's claim. The ALJ did not convene a medical
panel, despite a request by both parties7 counsel to do so. The
ALJ discounted conclusory statements of two expert witnesses
regarding Ashcroft's impairment ratings:
Dr. Capel merely recites what the insurance
adjustor was offering and postpones a rating;
Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of
15% without reference to any underlying facts
or industrial cause.
The ALJ made findings of fact and conclusions of law, which
the Commission essentially adopted. She determined that "the
true cause of [Ashcroft's] continuing problems stem from preexisting degenerative problems, intervening non-industrial
events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore, his claim
fails for lack of medical and legal causation."
Ashcroft moved the Industrial Commission for review. In his
motion, Ashcroft failed to raise issues regarding sufficiency of
the evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's findings, concentrating
his administrative appeal on the ALJ's refusal to convene a
medical panel. The Commission, after adopting the ALJ's
findings, affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits. Ashcroft now
seeks review of the Commission's denial.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES
We first consider the threshold issue of whether Ashcroft
properly preserved for review the issues he now raises, namely
issues of sufficiency of the evidence, standard of proof and
adequacy of the ALJ's findings, given that he failed to raise
these issues before the Commission.
Pease v. Industrial Comm'n. 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984) is
dispositive. The Pease court held that a petitioner, in moving
for review, has "the obligation to raise all the issues that
could have been presented at that time, and those issues not
raised [are] waived." Id. at 616; accord Smallwood v. Industrial
Comm'n, 841 P.2d 716, 718 n.l (Utah App. 1992). The rationale is
that by raising an issue at the administrative level, "either the
administrative law judge or the Commission could have adjudicated
the issue." Pease, 694 P.2d at 616.
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Ashcroft failed to raise the above issues before the
Commission. Of those issues, all except for his claim that the
Commission employed the wrong standard of proof, are claims that
could have been presented to the Commission. See id. Thus, we
deem that Ashcroft has waived the issues of sufficiency of the
evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's findings and that he cannot
now raise them for the first time on petition for judicial
review. Id. Ashcroft could not have raised the claim that the
Commission employed the wrong standard of proof until after the
Commission had made its review. Thus, this claim is properly
before this court even though it is raised for the first time on
judicial review.
STANDARD OF PROOF
Ashcroft claims the Commission applied the wrong standard of
proof when it denied his motion for review. In its review of the
ALJ's decision, the Commission employed the phrase "substantial
evidence." This is not the correct standard. The quantum of
evidence required to prove compensability is a preponderance of
the evidence. Lipman v. Industrial Comm'n, 592 P.2d 616, 618
(Utah 1979).
The distinction between preponderance of evidence and
substantial evidence is significant. A reviewing body, such as
this court, applies the standard of substantial evidence to
examine whether the record contains evidence supporting the
findings made by the trier of fact. The reviewing court does not
weigh the evidence. In contrast, a trier of fact, including the
Commission, determines whether the petitioner has met his or her
burden of proof, the standard being preponderance of the
evidence. The Commissions mistake as to the standard of proof
is not one of mere phraseology. Both Ashcroft and this court are
entitled to know that his proof was evaluated under the correct
standard.
We therefore remand the claim for the Commission to evaluate
it under the standard of preponderance of the evidence.
MEDICAL PANEL
Ashcroft claims the Commission acted unreasonably and
irrationally in not convening a medical panel. Ashcroft
preserved this issue by including it in his motion for review
before the Commission. See Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d
613, 616 (Utah 1984).
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The "Commission may refer the medical aspects of [a workers
compensation] case to a medical panel appointed by the
Commission." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77(1)(a) (1992) (emphasis
added). This statutory language is permissive, not mandatory.
See Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 839
P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1992).
Pursuant to section 35-1-77(1)(a), the Commission enacted
Rule 568-1-9 as a guideline in determining if a medical panel
should be convened. In contrast to the statute, the wording of
the agency rule is mandatory:
A. A panel will be utilized by the
Administrative Law Judge where:
1.
One or more significant medical issues
may be involved. Generally a significant
medical issue must be shown by conflicting
medical reports. Significant medical issues
are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of
permanent physical impairment which vary more
than 5% of the whole person, . . . .
Utah Code Admin. P. R568-1-9 (emphasis added). Thus, the rule
requires the Commission to convene a medical panel when the
evidence supports conflicting industrial impairment ratings with
more than a five percent difference. If the evidence regarding
impairment ratings supports ratings that vary by more than five
percent, as petitioner asserts, a medical panel would be
necessary to resolve the differences.
In short, the statute explicitly grants discretion to the
Commission as to whether to convene a medical panel. The
Commission, in turn, restricted its own discretion by
promulgating the Rule requiring it to convene a medical panel in
certain instances.
Our review is pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b16(4)(h)(ii) (1987) because this issue requires us to consider
whether the agency acted contrary to its own rule. Thus, "we
will not disturb the agency's interpretation or application of
the [rule] unless its determination exceeds the bounds of
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reasonableness and rationality." King v. Industrial Comm'n, 209
Utah Adv. Rep. 33, 35 (Utah App. 1993).l
Here, the Commission determined:
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in
connection with his assertion that a 15
percent rating was appropriate, was supported
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic.
We need some justification, and in the
absence of such, we cannot speculate. In the
case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by
him as to any appropriate rating, other than
a statement that the adjustor had decided
upon a five percent rating. We therefore
conclude that the evidence does not support
the applicant in this regard.
In short, the Commission found no specific or supported
impairment rating in the record, much less conflicting impairment
ratings. Nor did the Commission find that the ratings given
related to an industrial cause. Thus, there was no departure
from the agency rule because the agency rule did not apply.
Therefore, we need not consider whether any departure was
reasonable and rational.
CONCLUSION
Ashcroft could have, but failed to raise the issues of
sufficiency of the evidence and adequacy of the ALJ's findings.
We therefore deem that he has waived those issues. We affirm the
ALJ's refusal to convene a medical panel as reasonable and
rational because the ALJ found no specific or supported
impairment rating in the record. On the other hand, we cannot
affirm the Commission's decision because the Commission employed
the wrong standard of proof in its review of the evidence. We
therefore reverse the Commission's order and remand for the
1. In the event we determine an agency has in fact departed from
its own rule, we would then consider whether the departure was
reasonable and rational. King. 209 Utah Adv. Rep. at 34-35; Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii); SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) (Durham J.,
dissenting) ("courts also should uphold reasonable and rational
departures from agency rules absent a showing by the party
challenging the departure that the departure violated some other
right.") (citing Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div.. 842 P.2d 876,
879 (Utah 1992)).
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Commission to conduct a review employing the proper standard of
preponderance of the evidence.
sed in part, and remanded,

^6gnaT W. Garff, Judg

WE CONCUR:

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Gregor^j/iC. Orme, Judge
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OP UTAH
Case No. 91000984

DENIS ASHCROFT,
Applicant,
vs.
AIRFAX EXPRESS,
and/or
LIBERTY
MUTUAL INSURANCE,
Defendants.
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HEARING:

Commission Conference Room, Washington County
Commission offices, 197 East Tabernacle, St.
George, Utah on May 19, 1992, at 9:00 o'clock a.m.
Said hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the
Commission.

BEFORE:

The Honorable Lisa-Michele Church, Administrative
Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The applicant was present and represented by Bruce
Wilson, Attorney at Law.
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer,
Attorney at Law.

This is a claim for additional temporary total disability
compensation and medical expenses in connection with a 9/25/89
industrial injury.
The defendant insurance carrier denies
liability on the basis of medical and legal causation.
An evidentiary hearing was held, during which oral and written
evidence was presented. At the conclusion of the evidentiary
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Having been fully advised in the
premises, the Administrative Law Judge now enters the following
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, was employed as
a driver for Airfax Express in 1989, earning 18 cents per mile. He
was unmarried with no dependent children at the time of his injury.
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On September 25, 1989, the applicant was unloading boxes with a
dolly to persons on the ground at a Salt Lake K-Mart location, and
he bent over and could not straighten up. He felt pain in his
back, crawled to the edge of the truck bed and called his employer.
His employer told him to finish unloading, but Ashcroft had the
store employees do it for him. He then drove to another K-Mart and
did the same. Ashcroft drove to Ogden, parked the truck, and took
a taxi to the McKay Dee Hospital Emergency Room.
At the emergency room, they took x-rays, gave him muscle
relaxants and pain medication. No medical records were available
from this visit. Thereafter the applicant rode the bus back to St.
George. There, he consulted Dr. McGregor, his family doctor, on
September 28, 1989 (Ex. D-01, p. 5). Dr. McGregor advised complete
bed rest and continued to see him for two months. Dr. McGregor's
records indicate a diagnosis of bulging disc/spinal stenosis and
refer the applicant to Dr. Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on October 20, 1989, and
diagnosed, ". . . central disc herniation with minor spinal
stenosis at this level." He recommended conservative treatment.
(Ex. D-l, p. 19.)
In December, 1989, Dr. Bliss noted Ashcroft's continuing
bilateral leg pain and reviewed his myelogram and CT scan. He
stated his impression was M . . . sciatica-like symptoms with
central disc herniation and no definite evidence of neural
impingement." The applicant was then referred to Dr. Moress for a
neurological consult.
Dr. Moress saw Ashcroft on February 1, 1990 and recommended a
complete myelography. Dr. Bliss reviewed this recommendation and
noted " . . . [Dr. Moress] suspects possible demyelinating disorder
if symptoms are not explained by stenosis. MRI scan of c. spine
demonstrates multilevel disc disease. Previous lumbar myelogram
and CT scan demonstrated multiple level bulging discs without
definite stenosis." Later in the same report, Dr. Bliss stated, ".
. . Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as stemming from
his recent accident although multiple level disc disease indicates
that he has had pre-existing problems and in addition, back pain is
not his major complaint at this time." (Ex. D-l, p. 24.)
On February 2, 1990, in response to an inquiry from State
Vocational Rehabilitation, Dr. Bliss described Ashcroft's status as
". . . medically stable for return to limited employment in nonlaboring activity." (Ex. D-l, p. 26.) The applicant testified
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that he applied for and was denied unemployment benefits in late
1989, due to a prior lien.
On April 12, 1990, the applicant consulted another orthopedic
physician, Dr. Neal Capel.
Dr. Capel saw him on 4/12/90 and
recommended a program of conditioning for Ashcroft. In the notes
of that visit, Dr. Capel also mentioned, " . . . Liberty Mutual
account manager determined his permanent partial disability as 5%,
March 26, 1990, is the cutoff of benefits...The patient will have
his disability rating deferred until the conclusion of his work
hardening and conditioning in 6 weeks." (Ex. D-l, p. 32.)
At the May 10, 1990, visit with the applicant, Dr. Capel
described a visit Ashcroft had made to the emergency room for
intrascapular pain and noted, " . . . The most likely explanation is
an anxiety reaction with somatization." Dr. Capel continued to
recommend swimming, bicycle riding and general conditioning.
At the June 5, 1990, visit, Dr. Capel's office notes state, ".
. . The patient has no change in his status and was given a work
release. He has a job as a cook that is eminent [sic] and was
given a release from the welfare department." (Ex. D-l, p. 34.)
Ashcroft testified he did apply for the cook position. Following
this work release however, the applicant did not return to work,
but began attending school at Dixie College.
At the July 12, 1990, office visit, Dr. Capel stated that
sitting required by the applicants school activities was making
him uncomfortable. He also had some aching muscles. Later in the
summer, Dr. Capel prescribed Xanax for Ashcroft7s anxiety symptoms.
Ashcroft began working for his father in his grocery store in
Arizona in September, 1990. This job lasted a few weeks. Dr.
Capel's notes state, ". . .He has found that the back did fairly
well but his legs got tired as he was on his feet all day on
concrete." Dr. Capel continued to prescribe Xanax and Naprosyn.
(Ex. D-l, p. 37.)
Dr. Capel's notes for November 13, 1990, visit indicate that
Ashcroft was having back and leg pain, and had discontinued some of
his conditioning activities. His November 29, 1990, office notes
describe a "new episode" of back pain occurring when Ashcroft
lifted firewood and had, " . . . sudden onset of low back pain..."
(Ex. D-l, p. 39.) Dr. Capel diagnosed facet syndrome and low back
strain. The applicant testified that this episode involved him
lifting two or three pieces of wood branches that would fit in his
fireplace.
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At his January 29, 1991, office visit, the applicant reported
to Dr. Capel that he had worked in his father's grocery store again
during Christmas and experienced leg aches.
He requested a
prescription of Ascendin, but Dr. Capel declined to prescribe it
due to side effects.
At Ashcroft's visit with Dr. Capel on March 15, 1991, Dr.
Capel reported another episode of back pain: "The patient has been
getting along reasonably well until March 14, 1991, when he bent
down to clean up manure from his dog. He developed a sudden pain
in the low back and had difficulty standing up straight." Dr.
Capel concluded that the applicant had had a recurrence of
iliolumbar strain sprain and, ". . . 1 further advised him that as
far as the Industrial Commission is concerned, He is an
administrative catch 22 situation where he cannot force them to
assume care of his present complaint and while it is possibly
associated in quality relation, it is a new episode." (Ex. D-l, p.
41.) Ashcroft testified that he was using a 3/4 length shovel and
bent over and felt back pain. He then had difficulty straightening
up.
Following Dr. Capel'& treatment, the applicant was examined by
Dr. D.R. McNaught on May 8, 1991. Dr. McNaught concluded that
Ashcroft did have severe sciatica, due to the bulging of lumbar
discs L4,5 and possibly LS. He recommended that the applicant
investigate surgery, although Dr. McNaught expressed some
reservations about that approach.
In fact, the applicant was not able to pursue surgical
intervention on his back, due at least partially to the fact that
he has Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. (Ex. D-l, p. 61-62.)
The medical records indicate that Ashcroft tested positive for the
HIV virus in the 1980s, and this condition has since developed into
AIDS. (Ex. D-l, p. 10-17.) Dr. Hagen has treated the applicant
for AIDS since 1989. He stated in a letter dated May 14, 1992,
that the applicant's AIDS condition does not prevent him from
conducting his normal activities, (Ex. A-l). Hagan's records also
indicate that he treated Ashcroft for a variety of conditions, and
that Ashcroft was taking Prozac for depression.
Dr. McNaught referred the applicant to Dr. John Sanders for
consideration of his back condition. Dr. Sanders produced several
reports, including one dated August 9, 1991, which concluded that
surgical intervention was not warranted at that time, with no
reference to the AIDS factors.
Dr. Sanders also wrote a one
paragraph report dated October 7, 1991 stating: ". . .It is my
opinion that because he is unable to return to his usual work that
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he should have been given a disability rating of fifteen percent on
that basis alone." (Ex. D-l, p. 66.)
Dr. Boyd Holbrook performed a file review on the applicant's
case on April 10, 1992, and found that the majority of his problems
were not industrial in nature. Dr. Holbrook stated in part, ". .
. This man does have significant multi-level cervical disc disease
that is not related to his industrial injury and is not being
considered for any possible surgical treatment and appears to be a
relatively minor portion of his symptom complex." Dr. Holbrook
opined that no further medical treatment was needed in connection
with Ashcroft's 1989 injury, that, ". . .it does not appear that
more medical examinations or more diagnostic studies will assist in
the delineation or management of his problem," and that Chymopapain
injections are not advisable, (Ex. D-l, p. 67).
Ashcroft also sought chiropractic care from Dr. Wageman in St.
George. Those chiropractic records show the applicant received
treatments from September 27, 1991, through December, 1991 for 35
visits. Dr. Wageman believed that Ashcroft suffered, ". . .an
exacerbation of his post-traumatic injuries sustained in the
original accident," of 1989 (Ex. A-l).
The applicant's medical records indicate that he has undergone
the following diagnostic procedures since his industrial injury: xrays (10/89), CT scan (10/89), myelogram-CT scan (12/89), MRI
(2/90), CT scan (5/91), x-rays (10/91), MRI (10/91).
The applicant currently experiences aches in his back and
legs. He takes AZT, wellbutrin and dalmane, as well as headache
medicines.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The applicant in this matter, Denis Ashcroft, unfortunately
has failed to sustain his burden of proof that further temporary
total disability benefits or medical expense benefits are causally
related to his industrial accident of 1989. In fact, according to
medical specialists, the true cause of the applicant's continuing
problems stem from pre-existing degenerative problems, intervening
non-industrial events, and unrelated health conditions. Therefore,
his claim fails for lack of medical and legal causation.
At the time of the hearing, there was no evidence that
Ashcroft was unable to work during the period of his additional
temporary total disability claim. The applicant testified that he
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applied for unemployment, applied for a job as a cook, and in fact,
attended school full-time. He also worked in his father's grocery
store for a time. Two doctors had released him to work (Dr. Bliss,
2/2/90) (Dr. Capel, 6/5/90) and considered him medically stable.
No other medical provider has taken him off work. Utah workers
compensation law is specific on this issue, ". . . Once a claimant
reaches medical stabilization, the claimant is moved from temporary
to permanent status and he is no longer eligible for temporary
benefits." Booms v. Rapp Construction, 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah
1986.) Lack of stabilization is the plaintiffs burden to prove,
Griffith v. Industrial Commission, 754 P.2d 981 (Ct. of App. Utah
1988) .
Applicant's counsel argues that Ashcroft is entitled to
further benefits while he is still in the "diagnostic" stage of his
treatment for his back injury. Unfortunately, the medical records
clearly indicate that this case has long ago exhausted the
diagnostic stage. In fact, the applicant has been seen by at least
six specialists, and has had every possible diagnostic test
performed at least twice for his back pain symptoms. The case is
also tragically complicated by the presence of the applicant's AIDS
condition, which may not have become a ". . .severe medical
problem," but ultimately is life-threatening and therefore bound to
influence the applicant's choices with regard to surgery,
employment, as well as any optional medical treatment.
Further, the medical records in this file indicate that the
applicant's case involves psychological components. Moreover, when
carefully reviewed, it is illogical for one to attempt to pin all
the troublesome circumstances of a situation on a single incident
of lumbar strain several years ago, particularly when that
condition stabilized within months and was one which the doctors
refused to surgically treat.
Applicant's counsel further argues that the applicant may fall
into the rare category of one who suffers a sacroiliac condition
that is difficult to diagnose. There is no indication, however, of
that suspicion on behalf of Ashcroft's numerous physicians. Such
arguments are speculative and general, and cannot be the basis of
extending workers compensation benefits indefinitely to the
applicant.
The Administrative Law Judge agrees with Ashcroft's physicians
who have identified this case as a complex one, involving preexisting and psychological factors. In addition, the applicant
experienced two subsequent non-industrial events which occurred
when his doctor said he was doing well. The improvement he was
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making, together with the strenuous nature of the incidents
themselves, render those subsequent events intervening and causally
contributing to his continuing back problems•
As to the permanent partial impairment rating, the applicant
was paid compensation on a 5% whole person permanent partial
disability rating by the defendants. The Administrative Law Judge
does not find a specific rating in the records: Dr. Capel merely
recites what the insurance adjustor was offering and postpones a
rating; Dr. Sanders makes a conclusory statement of 15% without
reference to any underlying facts or industrial cause. Without a
well-supported rating in the record, and the Administrative Law
Judge can only note that a 5% impairment is reasonable for an
unoperated disc problem according to the AMA Guides To the
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Table 53.
ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the
Ashcroft, for additional temporary
expenses compensation in connection
September 25, 1989, should be and
legal and medical causation.

claim of the applicant, Denis
total disability and medical
with his industrial injury of
is hereby denied for lack of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not
subject to review or appeal.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law
Certified this ^f^day
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-6600
Denis Ashcroft,

*
*

Applicant,
vs.

*
*

DENIAL OF MOTION
FOR REVIEW

*
*

Airfax Express, and/or
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,

*
*

Case No. 91000984

*

Respondents.

*

*********************************

The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12.
The applicant's claim asks for additional compensation and
payments in connection with medical expenses, temporary total
compensation (TTC), permanent partial compensation (PPC), travel
expenses, interest, and medical treatment as a result of his back
injury on September 25, 1989. The administrative law judge (ALJ)
concluded that the applicant had failed to show legal and medical
causation, and therefore denied his claim. It is from this denial
that the applicant appeals based on allegations of the following
errors:
1.
Rejection by the ALJ of two permanent partial
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done by the
"Liberty Mutual account manager."
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel
be convened to consider among other items the question of maximum
medical improvement.
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors
were in the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not
decided upon a course of treatment.
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor's results
that the applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment.
5. This case contains objective evidence of several
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a "clear
possibility but for the complication of the AIDS."
The respondents argue in rebuttal that the medical evidence
did not give rise to the need for a medical panel review, and that
there is no conflict in the medical evidence regarding the
applicant's attainment of maximum medical improvement. We will
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briefly discuss the pertinent
allegations of error.

facts

as they

relate

to

the

There seems to be no dispute about the basic facts of the
original industrial injury in 1989. At that time, the applicant
was a driver for Air fax Express. On September 25, 1989, he was
using a dolly to unload boxes at a K-Mart. He bent over, and could
not thereafter stand straight. Experiencing pain in his back, he
crawled to the edge of his truck, and called his employer. His
employer told him to finish unloading/ He apparently was able to
have the K-Mart employees complete the task, and he subsequently
drove to another K-Mart where he was again able to have its
employees do the same. The applicant then drove to Ogden, parked
his truck, and used a taxi to get to a hospital emergency room.
The emergency room treatment and procedures consisted of xrays, muscle relaxants, and pain medication. After a trip back to
St. George by bus, the applicant was treated by his family doctor,
Dr. McGregor, on September 28, 1989. After a period of bed rest,
the applicant was seen by the doctor during the following two
months. Dr. McGregor diagnosed the applicant as having bulging
disc/spinal stenosis. The doctor referred the applicant to Dr.
Bliss, a neurosurgeon.
Dr. Bliss saw the applicant on a number of occasions during
the period October 20, 1989 through February 20, 1990. The doctor
recommended that the applicant receive conservative treatment, and
stated that "...Patient clearly interprets all of his problems as
stemming from his recent accident although multiple level disc
disease indicates that he has had pre-existing problems and in
addition, back pain is not his major complaint at this time."
Exhibit D-l, at 24. Further, the doctor concluded on February 2,
1990 that the applicant was "...medically stable for return to
limited employment in nonlaboring activity." Id., at 26.
During the period April 12, 1990 through March 15, 1991, the
applicant was treated by Dr. Capel. Dr. Capel placed the applicant
on a work hardening and conditioning program. On May 10, 1990, the
applicant experienced intrascapular pain, and went to an emergency
room for treatment.
The doctor explained this episode as an
anxiety reaction with somatization, and recommended general
conditioning, bicycle riding, and swimming. On June 5, 1990, the
applicant was given a work release, and apparently told the doctor
that he had an imminent job as a cook. Apparently, the applicant
did not return to work, but instead attended Dixie College as a
student.
Between July 12, 1990, and March 15, 1991, the applicant
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experienced muscle aches, back and leg pain, and anxiety symptoms
on various occasions. Low back pain appeared after the applicant
lifted two or three pieces of firewood, and a second episode
occurred when the applicant attempted to clean up some of his dog's
excrement. Dr. Capel noted on November 13, 1990 that the applicant
had discontinued some of his conditioning exercises.
It appears that surgery is either not warranted for the
applicant's medical problems, or is not recommended due to AIDS
which has developed in the applicant from his initial contact with
the HIV in the 1980's. Although one doctor recommended that the
applicant investigate surgery (Dr. McNaught), another (Dr. Hunter)
indicated that some surgery may be possible, two other doctors have
indicated that surgery is not warranted (Dr. Holbrook and Dr.
Sanders) . Dr. Holbrook reviewed the applicant's file and concluded
that the majority of the applicant's problems were not industrial
in nature.
The doctor concluded that additional medical
examinations or diagnostic studies will not assist in the
"delineation or management of [the applicant's] problem [in
connection with the 1989 injury...." Exhibit D-l at 67.
Contrary to the view of Dr. Holbrook, and others, is that of
a treating chiropractic physician, Dr. Wageman, who believed that
the applicant suffered "...an exacerbation of his post-traumatic
injuries sustained in the original accident..." of 1989. Exhibit
A-l. We have concluded that the specialists who determined that
the applicant's problems were not industrial in nature outweigh the
opinion of Dr. Wageman.
The ALJ concluded that the applicant had failed to sustain his
burden of proof that he was further entitled to TTC or to medical
expense benefits. There is substantial evidence in the file in
light of the entire record to show that the applicant's continuing
problems result from conditions unrelated to the industrial
accident. Thus, the applicant has failed to show medical and legal
causation.
Under these circumstances, no medical panel is
necessary.
The file shows that two doctors considered the applicant to be
medically stable during the period that the applicant claims
additional TTC. As a result, they had released the applicant to
work. It is clear that when an injured worker is released from
temporary total disability status that TTC should no longer be
received. Booms v. Rapp Construction. 720 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Utah
1986).
The applicant's argument that he was still within the
diagnostic stages of treatment is contrary to the evidence. Six
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specialists have reviewed his case over time, and the applicant has
had numerous diagnostic tests completed* None of the specialists
with the possible exception of Dr. Hunter have concluded that
surgery is warranted or possible.
Dr. Holbrook, for example,
concluded that no further examinations or diagnostic tests were
warranted. This statement shows that the diagnostic period was
complete.
This case is complicated by the applicants pre-existing
medical problems, and by his limitation on medical choices forced
upon him by AIDS.
In addition, the applicant suffered two
subsequent nonindustrial accidents which can be considered to be
intervening and causally contributing events to the applicants
continuing back problems.
In connection with the permanent partial impairment rating,
the applicant argues that he should be given a higher rating since
Dr. Sanders indicated that a 15 percent rating was appropriate
since the applicant could not work. The applicant also cited Dr.
Capel as support for this contention that the rating previously
determined at five percent was too low. We note that the applicant
was paid for his permanent partial impairment compensation. We
agree with the ALJ that a five percent impairment is reasonable for
an unoperated disc problem based upon the Guides to the Evaluation
of Permanent Impairment, Table 53 (3d ed. rev. 1990) published by
the American Medical Association.
The bald statement by Dr. Sanders, in connection with his
assertion that a 15 percent rating was appropriate, was supported
by absolutely no medical analysis or logic.
We need some
justification, and in the absence of such, we cannot speculate. In
the case of Dr. Capel, there is no statement by him as to any
appropriate rating, other than a statement that the adjustor had
decided upon a five percent rating. We therefore conclude that the
evidence does not support the applicant in this regard.
Under the circumstances, we conclude that the ALJ's findings,
conclusions of law, and order were based upon substantial evidence
in light of the entire record, and the legal conclusions were
correct. The applicant has failed to prove his case.
ORDER:
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge
dated June 29, 1992 is affirmed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah
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Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82,53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b16.
The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a
transcript of the hearing for appeals purposes.

Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman
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I certify that on August 21, 1992, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion For Review in the case of Denis Ashcroft was
mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage
paid:
Bruce Wilson
290 East 4000 North
Provo, Utah 84 604
Michael Dyer
P.O. Box 2465
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Lisa-Michele Church
Administrative Law Judge
Denis Ashcroft
330 South Mian
St. George UT 84770
Liberty Mutual Insurance
P. 0. Box 45440
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0440

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Legal Assistant

R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a
case to a medical panel:
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative
Law Judge where:
1 . One or more significant medical issues may be
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be
shown by conflicting medical reports.
Significant
medical issues are involved when there are:
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the
whole person,
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90
days, and/or
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting
to more than $2,000.
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report.
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for
consideration and clarification.
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where:
1 . The treating physician has failed or refused to
give an impairment rating,
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be
non-industrial, and/or
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such
further evaluation.
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund.
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Industrial Commission of Utah - Adjudication Division
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P. 0 . Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
(801) 530-6800
SUMMARY OF MEDICAL RECORD
(to be completed by treating physician)
EVALUATION FOR:
DATE OF INJURY:

EMPLOYER:

1. Has applicant been released for usual work?
2. Has applicant been released for light duty?

What date?
What date?

3. Applicant was required to be off work from
4. Has applicant a permanent injury?

to
If so, describe fully:

5. In case of permanent injury, on what date did or will the applicant reach a final state of recovery?
6. If there is a permanent injury, give your estimate of impairment in terms of percentage of loss of function:

7. Is there a medically demonstrative casual relationship between the industrial accident and the problems you
have been treating?
. Please explain as necessary:
8. What future medical treatment will be required as a result of the industrial accident?

9. What is the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to previously existing conditions,
whether due to accidental injury, disease of congenital causes?
!0.

What is the applicant's total physical impairment, if any, resulting from all causes and conditions, including
industrial injury?

11.

Did the industrial injury aggravate the applicant's pre-existing condition? Please explain as necessary.

Dated this

day of

, 19

Physician's Name (please print)

Physician's Specialty

Physician's Signature

Street Address

City/State/Zip

Physician's Telephone Number

